This paper presents a model in which final goods producers outsource intermediate input production. Intermediate inputs are differentiated and their production can be located at home or abroad. The model is used to examine competitive location policy in a (two-country) free trade area (FTA). It is shown that national public infrastructure investment has a positive effect on both the number of intermediate input producers and the return to the immobile factor in the home country. International outsourcing from home declines. Opposite effects are triggered in the partner country. In a welfare analysis we characterize national infrastructure policies that aim to maximize national income (net of tax costs) and compare the non-cooperative FTA-equilibrium with optimal policies from an integrated point of view. We show whether or not there is a need for policy coordination. Firm subsidies are discussed as an alternative to public infrastructure investment. Abstract This paper presents a model in which Þnal goods producers outsource intermediate input production. Intermediate inputs are differentiated and their production can be located at home or abroad. The model is used to examine competitive location policy in a (two-country) free trade area (F T A). It is shown that national public infrastructure investment has a positive effect on both the number of intermediate input producers and the return to the immobile factor in the home country. International outsourcing from home declines. Opposite effects are triggered in the partner country. In a welfare analysis we characterize national infrastructure policies that aim to maximize national income (net of tax costs) and compare the non-cooperative F T A-equilibrium with optimal policies from an integrated point of view. We show whether or not there is a need for policy coordination. Firm subsidies are discussed as an alternative to public infrastructure investment.
The Role of Public Infrastructure and Subsidies for Firm Location and International Outsourcing
Introduction
Location has become a key issue in the political debate on the macroeconomic consequences of the recent wave of globalization. In the past, production of manufacturing goods was to a large extent integrated within a single Þrm so that changing location was an exceptional phenomenon. It meant that a wide range of different production stages had to be shifted from one place to another. Technical progress in recent years has dramatically changed the production process. Increased fragmentability and lower costs for service links make production and assembling of different parts of the value added chain at different locations feasible and proÞtable (see Jones, 2000; and Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001 ). Therefore, modern industrial production is characterized by a high and increasing degree of vertical fragmentation and international outsourcing.
1 The optimal location is chosen for individual production stages, and specialized input producers make use of competitive location advantages all over the world. These changes in Þrm location are usually associated with international capital ßows.
Indeed, it is a salient feature of empirical evidence that at the same time capital mobility, Þrm mobility and the volume of intermediate goods trade have increased substantially.
However, an integrated approach for analyzing these phenomena is so far missing in the literature. To close this gap is the purpose of our paper. It provides a simultaneous explanation of the location of input producers, the volume of international outsourcing (in the form of intermediate input trade) and the returns to immobile production factors in a model with international capital mobility. Explanatory variables are the economic fundamentals and national public infrastructure provision which is used for the purpose 1 Hummels et al. (2001) Þnd for a sample of 14 economies (10 OECD members and four emerging markets countries) that the share of exports due to vertical specialization (i.e., international outsourcing) in total exports grew by about 30% over the period of and that growth in vertical specialization accounted for 30% of the growth in the overall export/GDP ratio. provide evidence on the development of outsourcing to Eastern economies after the fall of the Iron Curtain.
See also Feenstra (1998) and Feenstra and Hanson (2001) for a discussion on the relvance of vertical fragmentation and international outsourcing in modern industrial production.
of competitive location policy. 2 Firm subsidies are another instrument of competitive location policy that is considered.
Our model emphasizes the importance of public infrastructure investment for a country's attractiveness as a location for intermediate input production. There is broad consensus among economists and politicians that public infrastructure for Þrms is an important aspect of competitive location policy. EU members, for example, agreed upon a benchmark method to determine the competitiveness of the EU economies. Among 54 indicators that are used for the assessment, provision of infrastructure plays a prominent role (see Brakman et al., 2002) . And the Portland Development Commission (2002) states that "an important role of government is to increase economic capacity by improving quality and efficiency of public infrastructure and utilities necessary to business operation" (p.
7). In the context of vertical fragmentation, governments can use public infrastructure provision as a policy instrument to attract a higher number of intermediate input producers and therefore to reduce the volume of a country's component imports from abroad and to increase its attractiveness as a target for foreign outsourcing. foreign suppliers (international outsourcing) or be purchased at home (national outsourc-2 "A competitive location policy is a comprehensive policy ... that includes all aspects that deÞne the attractiveness of a location." (Brakman et al., 2002, p. 2 
; in translation of Dutch Ministry of Economic
Affairs, 1999, p. 114 f.) 3 There is indeed strong empirical evidence that infrastructure matters for international outsourcing activities. For instance, Egger and Egger (2005) Þnd that infrastructure quality in the target countries explains about 30-40 percent of EU outward processing trade.
ing). Intermediate input production makes use of internationally mobile capital. Final goods markets as well as factor markets are competitive.
We assume that two small industrialized economies characterized by identical production technologies form a free trade agreement (F T A). Endowments consist of immobile labor and mobile capital that is owned by residents of the respective country. Intermediate input suppliers can decide about their location within the F T A, thereby taking into account the attractiveness of the two F T A member countries for intermediate input production. The idea that Þrms are located at some place implies that there are Þxed costs which are incurred at a certain location and not at another (making imperfect competition in the intermediate goods market a key aspect of our analysis). Hence, the attractiveness of a country depends on the Þxed costs requirements for setting up a Þrm. Governments can inßuence the location choice of input suppliers through national infrastructure policy.
A higher level of public infrastructure reduces the Þxed cost of setting up a Þrm in this economy and therefore raises the attractiveness of a country. (See for a similar assumption Bougheas et al., 2000; and Justman et al., 2001.) 4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature and shows how our analysis contributes. After introducing the basic framework in Section 3 and solving the F T A-equilibrium in Section 4, Section 5 provides the comparative-static analysis of the effects of public infrastructure investment on Þrm location, international outsourcing and wages (i.e., the factor return to immobile labor). In Section 6 we analyze the role of public infrastructure investment as a competitive location policy instrument that is
Þnanced by lump-sum taxes. In addition, we investigate the role of policy coordination by comparing the non-cooperative policy equilibrium with optimal infrastructure provision from an integrated point of view. In Section 7 we discuss the effects of infrastructure 4 Holtz-Eakin and Lovely (1996) allow public infrastructure investment to affect either variable or
Þxed costs of production. In their approach, the two types of infrastructure investment may have quite different implications in terms of output and the number of producers. The robustness of our results is discussed in Subsection 7.1. We Þnd that the basic mechanisms remain valid if public infrastructure reduces variable production costs rather than Þxed costs.
investment that reduces variable production costs and analyze subsidies as an instrument of competitive location policy. The last section concludes.
Related Literature
Due to our focus on the international location of input suppliers, our analysis is closely related to the traditional trade literature dealing with international outsourcing as intermediate goods trade. (See for instance Arndt, 1997; Deardorff, 2001; Jones, 2000; Jones and Kierzkowski, 2001; and Kohler, 2003.) However, there are important differences.
Models in the vein of the traditional trade literature make the assumption of perfect competition at Þnal as well as intermediate goods markets and do not account for the role of
Þrms and their location decisions. In our model we account for Þrm location by assuming that set-up costs have to be incurred in the country of production. This implies imperfect competition. A crucial mechanism in our analysis is the interaction between the location of intermediate goods producers and the attraction of internationally mobile capital. The relationship between capital mobility and international outsourcing has Þrst been analyzed by Feenstra and Hanson (1996) . They assume that capital movements are triggered by scarcity of this factor in a certain economy and analyze the impact of capital ßows on the location of input production. However, they do not account for the role of public infrastructure investment as an instrument of competitive location policy. In our analysis, national capital supply plays no role since capital is traded at an exogenous world interest rate. Capital ßows are triggered by differences in public infrastructure investment (or subsidies) which make a country attractive for Þrm entry.
Specifying Þrms explicitly is less important in a world without scale economies. But, if external economies of scale and agglomeration effects are important, the number of producers at a certain location is crucial for the performance of countries. In this respect, our model is closely related to the new economic geography literature that highlights the relationship between Þrm location and factor mobility to explain a core-periphery pattern in (international) goods production (see for instance Krugman, 1991) . However, the focus of those models lies on Þnal goods production, whereas outsourcing of intermediate component production is typically not considered. More recently, agglomeration effects have also been addressed in the tax competition literature. See Baldwin and Krugman (2004) , Kind et al. (2000) and Ludema and Wooton (2000) . These papers emphasize that governments can tax mobile factors if they earn rents due to their location in the core. Bucovetsky (2004) analyzes locational competition through public input provision in a multi-region framework with external economies of scale. In that paper, national provision of public inputs is put forward as an explanation for core-periphery patterns in industrial production. Furthermore, it is shown that overor underprovision of the public input may arise, depending on the particular objective function of governments. However, Bucovetsky's model is not in the tradition of the new economic geography literature since it neglects the role of transport costs. Moreover, he considers perfect competition so that it is the amount of the mobile factor employed at a certain location and not the number of Þrms that determines total income. Martin and Rogers (1995) investigate the role of public expenditures on national and international transport costs for Þrm location in a new economic geography framework. 5 For an exception see Krugman and Venables (1995) For completeness, it is worth noting that our model includes some aspects which are also addressed in the literature on multinational Þrms, like location decisions for production plants (see for instance Markusen, 2002; Markusen and Venables, 2000) . However, that literature focuses on intra-Þrm rather than arm's length transactions. Moreover, in the theory of multinational Þrms both the decision on setting up a production plant abroad and the decision on intra-Þrm trade are simultaneously made by a multinational's headquarters. This is different in our model of international outsourcing, where the input suppliers decide on whether to set up intermediate goods production at a certain location and the Þnal goods producers decide on the volume of international outsourcing. Recently, several studies have analyzed a multinational's decision to enter a foreign market through direct investment and subsidiary production or through international outsourcing and arm's length transaction. (See e.g. Helpman, 2003, 2004; and Markusen, 2002 .) Such a decision problem is not considered in our paper. We focus on market transactions. Bilateral relations based on contractual arrangements are not considered.
makers. They conclude that poor countries should prefer infrastructure projects that reduce national transport costs, to avoid relocation provoked by lower international transport costs. 7 Bougheas et al. (2003) analyze the effciency of uncoordinated investment in infrastructure which reduces variable transportation costs. Their results point to the possibility of overinvestment in the public provision of national and international transport facilities. Further contributions to public infrastructure spending in settings of the new economic geography include Bougheas et al. (1999 Bougheas et al. ( , 2000 and Justman et al. (2002) . However, as noted by Baldwin et al. (2003, p. 421) : "Relatively few papers to date address issues of tax and tax competition in an economic geography framework ".
The contribution of our paper can be summarized in the following way: First, our focus is on the location of input producers. This allows us to investigate the nexus between factor mobility, outsourcing and Þrm location, when governments can invest in infrastructure to improve the attractiveness of a country as a location for industrial production.
Second, we rigorously investigate possible Nash equilibria of strategic infrastructure provision in a 2-country setting and compare the results with the outcome under coordination.
Thereby, the existence of transport costs plays a key role for the basic incentive of strategic infrastructure provision. However, transport costs are exogenous in our analysis. We focus on infrastructure provision which reduces Þxed costs for setting up Þrms. This procedure not only allows us to solve the model analytically (thereby avoiding reliance on numerical simulation exercises) but also makes a comparison between infrastructure provision (a pure public good) and subsidies (characterized by perfect rivalry) possible.
Theoretical Framework
We consider economies with a single Þnal good Y (the numéraire good) and two primary 
8 The assumption α < ρ guarantees that the marginal product of x i increases in the use of x j , j 6 = i.
An immediate consequence of this assumption is that overall output Y is positively related to labor endowment L. This can be seen by using (8), (A.15) and the deÞnition of A k (given below (9)) in (1).
Following Ethier (1982) we assume that the contribution of intermediate inputs x i can be aggregated by a CES-index. For the production of differentiated inputs employment of K is essential. To keep the analysis tractable, we assume that the production of differentiated inputs does not require employment of factor L. The production technology in the Xsector is identical for all Þrms and given by
In addition, setting up an input production facility has Þxed costs. They are incurred by investing f units of Þnal output. We follow the common approach that monopolistic competition characterizes the market for the differentiated intermediate inputs x i . Free entry of input producers leads to average cost pricing, so that revenues equal total costs in equilibrium.
Equilibrium under a Free Trade Agreement
Let H and F be two industrialized economies characterized by identical production tech- (2001) and Lloyd (2001) . Finally, the RoW may employ an integrated production technology for commodity Y , so that there is neither supply of nor demand for sophisticated intermediate inputs in the RoW. In any case, the production structure in the RoW is not explicitly speciÞed.
The small country assumption paired with perfect mobility of factor K implies that its factor return, r, is determined in the world market outside the F T A. This renders country-speciÞc endowments with capital irrelevant for the subsequent analysis. The price, w k , for the immobile factor depends on its location k = H, F . It is determined by the condition that labor earns its marginal product and full-employment L k = L k prevails in equilibrium. Thus, according to (1)
where Y k is the equilibrium level of Þnal output in country k = H, F . Denote by 
, which gives:
where
The number of input producers, n H , n F , will be endogenously determined by the entry/exit decisions of Þrms.
Using (4a), (4b) and deÞning aggregate price index P
, are the demand functions relevant for an x i -producer located in country H and an x j -producer located in country F , respectively. This gives us for the maximization problem of an x i -producer located in country H:
, k = H, F , is exogenous to the single producer. Note that, according to (2), marginal production costs of intermediate goods are equal to factor price r of internationally mobile K which is determined in the world market. t > 0 are unit trade costs for international x-transactions, identical for both economies. Setting up an input production facility in country k, requires investment of f k units of Þnal output.
The country-speciÞc Þxed costs f k depend on the country's infrastructure and reßect the attractiveness of a location for intermediate goods production and thus employment of K. The maximization problem of an x j -producer located in country F is:
Within each country intermediate input producers are symmetric. Solving (5) and (6) (1) and (4)- (6) are given by the following expressions:
are constants depending on r, L k and technology parameters.
In an Ethier-type model with constant elasticity of substitution between varieties,
Þrms set prices according to a constant markup rule. Since labor is not employed in the production of intermediate goods and the factor return to capital is determined in the world market outside the F T A, input prices are exogenous, according to (7). In addition, the same production technologies are used in the two economies. Hence, input prices are
However, transport costs imply that export prices are higher than prices for domestic sales, i.e. p . A higher L k renders country k a more attractive location for input production, since it increases local demand there. As a consequence, other things equal, n k increases and n k 0 declines if L k rises.
Finally, according to (1), a rise in the number of input producers has a positive effect on labor productivity in the Þnal goods sector. Thus, any policy that promotes Þrm entry in the intermediate goods sector positively feeds back on Þnal output and wages.
Combining equations (7)- (9) with (1) and (3), we get for the equilibrium wage
with
− 1´. Changes in the Þxed costs by public infrastructure investment affect the number of input producers simultaneously with their size. Lower Þxed costs allow smaller and more Þrms to enter proÞtably. This is good for labor productivity and wages. The following section discusses the role of infrastructure policy for Þrm location, international outsourcing and wages in detail. For a formal derivation of (7)- (10) see Appendix A.1.
The F T A-equilibrium was derived under the assumption of interior solutions (i.e., (8) and (9), the following conditions are necessary and sufficient for an interior solution
and
Roughly spoken, the two conditions are fulÞlled if Þxed costs f H , f F and immobile factor (11) and (12) are satisÞed for any t > 0.
5 Public Infrastructure Expenditures, Firm Location,
International Outsourcing and Wages
In this section we provide a positive analysis on how public infrastructure expenditures affect the location of input producers, the amount of international outsourcing and wages in the two economies. As mentioned in the introduction we follow Bougheas et al. (2000) and assume that public infrastructure only has an impact on Þxed costs f k . An increase of public infrastructure investment in country H reduces Þxed costs f H and therefore increases the attractiveness of country H as a location of intermediate input production.
Fixed costs in country F are not affected. 11 Of course, there is an indirect effect of infrastructure expenditures on the marginal productivity of immobile labor, due to a change in number, size and location of input suppliers. This results in wage adjustments in the two economies, as will be explained in detail below.
We assume that there are two types of Þxed costs: (i) Þxed costs f P k that are reduced/replaced by public infrastructure investment and (ii) Þrm-speciÞc Þxed costs f 0 k that are independent of public infrastructure investment.
12 Examples for the Þrst type of Þxed costs are connection facilities to outside world (e.g., internet). An example for the second type would be establishment of the intra-Þrm information and communication system. Formally, public infrastructure investment and Þxed costs are related in the following way:
G k represents the level of public infrastructure investment. f Next we consider the impact of public infrastructure investment on international outsourcing from the two economies. We are interested in both the volume of international
as well as the international outsourcing in-
, which is a measure for country k's exposure to intermediate goods 13 The comparative-static analysis is made under the assumption that public infrastructure investments are Þnanced by lump-sum taxes, which do not have feedback effects. See Section 6 for the budget constraint of the government.
imports. 14 The impacts of public infrastructure investment on international outsourcing are summarized in Proposition 2. outsourcing for given resource requirements per output, maybe due to technological changes in the Þnal goods production, and (iii) variations in international relative to national outsourcing. Since we are interested in the foreign impact only, we think that
is the better measure.
local producers in country H. The opposite Þnding holds for the international outsourcing intensity ξ F .
Finally, policymakers are interested in the effects of infrastructure provision on wages.
(Note that the earnings of capital owners are determined in the world market.) At this stage of our analysis we focus on gross wages. The tax burden of public infrastructure investment is taken into account in Section 6.
According to (1) and (3), marginal productivity of L and thus the wage rate is a function of the CES-aggregator X of intermediate components. As a consequence, wages critically depend on how many input suppliers are located in H and F , respectively, and on the volume of intermediate inputs purchased from Þrms at the two locations. The following proposition summarizes the wage effects resulting when public infrastructure policy changes the attractiveness of location H.
Proposition 3 A G H -induced decline of Þxed costs f H leads to higher wages in country
H and lower wages in country F .
Proof. Proposition 3 follows from (8), (10) and (13).
A decline of Þxed costs f H raises the number of input producers located in country H and reduces the number of input producers located in country F (see Proposition 1). These Þrm number adjustments exhibit opposing effects on CES-index X H and, by virtue of (1) and (3), also on w H . If all inputs were used to the same extent, the total effect would be ambiguous since the effect on n H + n F is ambiguous. However, we have a home bias. According to (8), inputs coming from domestic suppliers have a higher weight in Þnal goods production. Therefore, the positive effect on X H of the increased number of suppliers located in H dominates the negative effect of a decreased number of suppliers from F . In sum, labor productivity and thus w H unambiguously rise, when G H is increased (as long as
The opposite effect is triggered in country F .
In sum, we Þnd that public infrastructure investment by increasing the attractiveness of a country as a location for intermediate input production reduces international outsourcing of that country and has a positive impact on wages. At the same time, the public infrastructure investments have negative effects on the partner country. The number of input producers located in country F declines. This is accompanied by an increase in outsourcing from F to H and leads to lower wages in F .
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In Section 6 we extend the positive analysis presented in this section and investigate the role of public infrastructure expenditures as a policy strategy. Thereby, we assume that total income of residents, net of the tax burden of public infrastructure investment, is the objective of the government.
Public Infrastructure Investment as Competitive Location Policy
By providing a certain level of infrastructure for Þrms governments can inßuence the attractiveness of their country as a location for suppliers of intermediate inputs, the production of which is outsourced by the producers of Þnal output. This affects the macroeconomic equilibrium, in particular the wage earned by immobile labor. Thus, the choice of G k is a policy instrument for increasing the citizens' welfare. 16 Welfare is given by national income net of tax payments for public infrastructure Þnance, i.e. by
T k denotes lump-sum taxes which are used for Þnancing public infrastructure investment G k in country k and rK k is capital income of residents of country k. Since L k , K k and r 15 Our framework also allows us to study the relationship between capital ßows and the factor return to immobile labor. Since capital is used for producing x k , capital ßows mirror the outsourcing streams. Like in Feenstra and Hanson (1996) , we can show that the country which experiences a capital inßow gains relative to the other economy, which suffers from capital outßow. However, in our model the capital ßows are triggered by national infrastructure investment, an issue which is not addressed in Feenstra and Hanson (1996) . For further details on how public infrastructure provision affects cross-country wage differentials, see Egger and Falkinger (2003) . 16 It is important to keep in mind that G k represents only infrastructure for Þrms. Public infrastructure for households has of course different effects.
are exogenously given, welfare can only be inßuenced if wages w k and/or lump-sum taxes vary. Both w k and T k depend on the chosen level G k of public infrastructure for Þrms.
It is assumed that providing level G k costs µ k G k units of Þnal output,where µ k ≥ 0 is a constant. The higher µ k , the more costly it is to provide G k . Since Y is the numéraire good,
gives the tax burden imposed by public infrastructure provision G k in country k.
It is clear that the optimal infrastructure choice critically depends on the functional speciÞcation of f P k (·). For the sake of simplicity we assume that f
The Optimal Level of Public Infrastructure Investment
According to Proposition 3, wage w k is an increasing function of public infrastructure level 
18 G k cannot further reduce Þxed costs, rendering gross income W k 0 independent of G k for infrastructure levels above G k . However, welfare W k (G k , G k 0 ) declines due to the additional tax burden induced by higher public infrastructure expenditures. In Figure 2 welfare function W
The convexity of W k 0 is preserved, as long as the shape of f P k (G k ) is not "too convex ". For a formal discussion on this issue, see Egger and Falkinger (2003) .
18 The remaining Þxed costs are Þrm-speciÞc, recall (13). For any given level of public infrastructure quality G k 0 in the partner country there is a threshold µ k (G k 0 ) of the cost of infrastructure provision at which the government in country k is indifferent between choosing
where w k (G k , G k 0 ) denotes the equilibrium wage in country k when the infrastructure level is G k in country k and G k 0 in country k 0 . Obviously, for a given level G k 0 in the partner country k 0 , the optimal choice for country k is
The infrastructure level G k 0 in the partner country affects w k , according to our analysis in Section 5, and thus µ k (G k 0 ), according to (16). Combining these facts, we obtain the following results concerning the optimal infrastructure policy of country k in response to a given infrastructure policy of partner country k 0 .
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is the optimal response to
19 Equilibria in mixed strategies are not considered.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The economic interpretation of Proposition 4 is as follows. If a country's productivity in producing public infrastructure is high so that infrastructure can be improved at rela- From the analysis in Section 5 we know that an infrastructure-induced welfare gain in country H reduces wages and thus welfare in country F (see Proposition 3). This negative effect on welfare in country F is not considered by H's government when choosing the optimal level of public infrastructure investment. As a consequence uncoordinated infrastructure policies may lead to suboptimal F T A-welfare W
sider the case of two symmetric countries. Then, national welfare net of taxes is given by
. Thus, the pay-off matrix for the two possible choices of optimal infrastructure policy G k = 0 and G k = G is of the form
According to Proposition 4, three cases must be distinguished:
If cost µ is relatively low G H = G and G F = G are dominant strategies, i.e.
Total welfare resulting in the non-cooperative equilibrium is thus
It is easy to check that (17) is consistent with 21
This does not mean that policy coordination at G H = G F = 0 necessarily increases welfare.
For instance, if µ is sufficiently low, G H = G F = G is also optimal from the point of view of F T A-welfare.
In the case of µ k = 0, such an outcome is guaranteed. Costless public infrastructure investments are unrealistic. But the case µ k = 0 is interesting for the following reason. We can interpret an increase in G Under high infrastructure cost µ, we have (from part (ii) of Proposition 4)
in the non-cooperative equilibrium. Since
according to Proposition 3 and the deÞnition of W , the inequalities in (19) imply W ¡ G, G ¢ < W (0, 0). Thus, in the case of a high µ policy coordination at G H = G F = G would deÞ-
In the case of intermediate cost levels µ, we have
in the non-cooperative equilibrium. The ranking described by (21) implies
may be beneÞcial.
Due to the positive external scale economies of the Ethier model, attracting Þrms by providing public infrastructure for them has negative external effects on the partner country which loses Þrms. Hence, uncoordinated competitive policy may lead to "overprovision" of public infrastructure for Þrms. This result differs from the Þndings in the public economics literature on infrastructure provision and capital mobility, discussed by as improvements in the quality of economic order, which relates a country's attractiveness for intermediate input production to characteristics like property rights. A higher quality of economic order increases both national and F T A-income. A more detailed discussion on this issue can be found in Egger and Falkinger (2003) .
On the one hand we have
according to Proposition 3. Sinn (2003) . In that literature, positive scale economies (external to the individual Þrm)
are not considered so that the equilibrium under Þscal competition (between identical economies) is efficient. This result is of particular relevance for the recent discussion on how to promote national infrastructure projects in the enlarged EU25 area. In view of our results, the optimal allocation of EU infrastructure expenditures does not necessarily lead to identical infrastructure quality in all member countries. Rather, if distributional justice in the F T A is at the agenda, it may be more efficient to exploit agglomeration rents by allowing for 25 However, the possibility of overprovision of public goods is not new in the literature of tax competition.
In the absence of external scale economies overprovision may be a problem if tax harmonization intensiÞes infrastructure competition (see Sinn, 2003, p. 45) . Moreover, Sørensen (2004) shows that in the presence of lump sum transfers, tax competition results in overprovision of public goods. Finally, in Justman et al. (2001) entry and exit of regions in the location market can explain excessive investment in infrastructure. 26 This is in contrast to Bougheas et al. (2003) , where coordination should always increase efficiency.
In contrast to Bucovetsky (2004) , an equilibrium with underprovision of public infrastructure for Þrms cannot arise.
core-periphery patterns in the EU and to redistribute these rents among union members. This is a further argument against the current design of Structural Funds in the EU. As put forward by Bougheas et al (2003, p. 904 
Discussion
The aim of this section is twofold. First, we investigate in which way our results depend upon the simplifying assumption that public infrastructure expenditures reduce Þxed costs but let marginal costs of input production unaffected. Second, we discuss Þrm subsidies as an instrument of competitive location policy (in contrast to public infrastructure investment).
Public Infrastructure Investments and variable production costs
The analysis in Sections 5-6 builds upon the assumption that higher public infrastructure expenditures lower Þxed costs but do not affect variable costs of input production. To see how important this simplifying assumption is for our results, we brießy discuss the role of public expenditures that aim at reducing variable production costs. Such a modiÞcation makes the analysis much more complicated and we are not able to provide a full analytical Infrastructure investment which lowers variable production costs leads to lower intermediate input prices, according to the constant markup rule in the Ethier model (with constant elasiticy of substitution between input varieties). As a consequence, the contribution margin declines and Þrms must sell a larger volume of output to cover the given level of Þxed costs. This tends to reduce the number of input producers that can survive in the market. At the same time, the price reduction leads to an increase in the demand for differentiated inputs. This makes it easier to cover Þxed costs and has a positive effect on the number of Þrms. In general, it is not clear, which of the two effects dominates (see Holtz-Eakin and Lovely, 1996) . However, since the factor return to capital is exogenous in our model, condition 0 < α < ρ < 1 is sufficient for a positive Þrm number effect. 
Subsidies as an Alternative to Public Infrastructure Investment
So far our analysis has not allowed for any rivalry in the use of public infrastructure by Þrms. Although a complete analysis of impure public infrastructure goods provision is beyond the scope of our paper, we want to address an extreme form of rivalry in the use of public expenditures, namely Þrm subsidies. Suppose that the government subsidizes
where n k (G k ) is the equilibrium number of Þrms under Þxed costs f k (G k ). (Again, we focus on interior solutions so that n k > 0.) It is straightforward to show that T k is an
Hence, it is always beneÞcial for an individual country to provide some subsidy to foster entry of intermediate goods producers. Two forces are responsible for this result: The
= n k (0), according to (24), and
, according to (10), (14) and the fact that B = e B + 1. Note further that A k < (B − 1) φC k , because of α < ρ < 1.
Combining these facts with (9) we get (25). 
so that subsidizing entry of intermediate goods producers in country k a bit is also beneÞ-cial from the perspective of the F T A. Nonetheless, policy coordination may be necessary to avoid overprovision of national Þrm subsidies. In addition, supranational redistribution may be required if equalization of locational attractiveness is a political goal, like for instance in the EU.
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Concluding Remarks
In this paper we set up a model with one Þnal good and differentiated intermediate inputs that are assembled by the use of immobile labor. We investigate how the location of intermediate input suppliers, international outsourcing and wages are affected by decisions on public infrastructure investment in two member countries of a F T A. We Þnd that national public infrastructure investment, which reduces Þxed costs for intermediate input production, raises the number of input suppliers, reduces international outsourcing activities of Þnal goods producers and leads to higher wages in the home country. The (10), (14) and the facts that B = e B + 1 and
. 31 The role of subsidies as a public input has been discussed in Kind et al. (2000) . In their analysis subsidies (i.e., a negative tax rate on capital) as an outcome of Þscal competition are most likely in a symmetric equilibrium, in which production is not concentrated. In contrast to this, our analysis points to the role of Þrm subsidies for explaining core-periphery patterns in industrial production. To put it differently, subsidies can explain ex-post differences of ex-ante symmetric countries.
opposite holds in the partner country, where the number of produced varieties and the return to the immobile factor decline, whereas international outsourcing is stimulated.
In a second step we investigate the role of public infrastructure investment as a competitive location policy of national governments which aim to maximize gross national income minus (lump-sum) tax payments. Since governments do not take into account the negative effects of location policy on the F T A partner country, policy coordination may result in a higher overall F T A-welfare level. More speciÞcally, non-cooperative policies may result in overprovision of public infrastructure for Þrms. Moreover, there are distributional conßicts. In particular, core-periphery patterns can arise even among ex ante symmetric countries. Indeed, core-periphery patterns may also be the result of F T Aincome maximizing policy coordination.
To study the robustness of our results with respect to the assumption on the cost effects of infrastructure provision, we have discussed public expenditures which aim at reducing variable costs of input production. It turns out that such a modiÞcation does not change our main qualitative results. We have also investigated the role of Þrm subsidies as an instrument of competitive location policy. Thereby, it is shown that some subsidization of entry of intermediate goods suppliers is beneÞcial for both the individual country and the F T A. However, policy coordination may be required to avoid overprovision of subsidies or to reach the goal of equalization of locational attractiveness.
Concerning policy implications for regional trading blocs like the EU, our analysis provides the following insights. Generally, structural funds that are aimed at economic growth and the recovery of regions should explicitly account for coordination failures of national infrastructure provision and potential efficiency losses of a uniform level of infrastructure quality. More speciÞcally, the analysis suggests three conclusions: First, an optimal infrastructure policy from an integrated point of view may result in signiÞcantly different levels of national infrastructure qualities paired with side payments to reach distributional goals within the union. Second, there is no need to compensate at the EU level for national underprovision of public infrastructure for Þrms. Third, national measures of subsidizing Þrm entry are not necessarily inefficiency generating distortions to be hindered by a central authority. However, to avoid overprovision of subsidies in the strategic locational competition between governments, some upper bound of Þrm subsidies may be required.
Next, we derive the equilibrium number of Þrms. Since Þrms within countries are symmetric we have
¢ ρ ¤ 1/ρ , with k 6 = k 0 ∈ {H, F }. In view of (A.1) this reduces to
(A.8)
Moreover, using (A.2) and the deÞnition of P In view of (A.9) this can be rewritten as (A.12) with N k := n k +n k 0 ¡ r r+t ¢ σ−1 . An analogous expression holds for x k 0 k 0 . After straightforward transformations, (A.12) can be rewritten as A.13) and in a similar way we obtain and (A.14) give us (9).
In a Þnal step, we derive equilibrium wages. Using
, according to (A.13), we obtain In the following derivations, Þxed costs in country F are given by f F and G H ∈ £ 0, G H £ holds.
Proof of Proposition 1
Use (8), (9) and (13) 
Proof of Proposition 2
Step 1: Public infrastructure investment and the volume of international outsourcing:
Use (8) and (13) 
Step 2: Public infrastructure investment and the international outsourcing intensity:
According to (8) 
Proof of Proposition 4
Using f F , in (13) and substituting (8) for x k k in (10) we get from (16) (A.20) for all G k 0 ∈ £ 0, G k 0 £ , k 6 = k 0 ∈ {H, F }. This and the fact that µ k (G k 0 ) was deÞned as the threshold at which the government is indifferent between G k = 0 and G k = G k establish the proposition. ¥ 32 The ambiguity in the sign of d(nH +nF ) dGH for f F < f H (G H ) has been shown in a simulation analysis. 
